


# EQUILIBRIUM OF ASYMMETRY: DEFENSE IN A CONVERGENT ENVIRONMENT

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**Abstract**—This article examines the materialization of a supra, or convergent, environment across strategic, operational, modeling, and planning domains, emerging from implemented political and military actions. The analysis is delineated through the OODA loop framework to interpret the dynamics of the current conflict and the actions undertaken. It further explores specific components, as well as emerging trends and their effects, with particular emphasis on their implications for the future development of knowledge in strategy, operational art, and design and planning.

**Keywords**—convergent environment, asymmetric and hybrid warfare, strategy, operational art

## FOREWORD

FROM ancient to present times, history of warfare is littered with continuous endeavor of denying adversary freedom of maneuver. What previously were walls became strategically positioned castles and fortification. Those progressed to trenches and to rapid maneuver on the battlefield. The rule was always the same; defend the territory by denying or at least halting adversaries' maneuver actions to achieve advantage and apply counteroffensive until all military and political goals are attained.

In the last thirty years, slowly and almost quietly, the approach to warfare is being reshaped by scaling the information technology to the highest levels. Proportionally countering maneuver with anti-access/area denial capabilities. In addition, slowly building augmented capacities of actions that can deliver warfare level outcome, without ground combat contact. Example of this is digitally networked artillery.

Whatever the viewpoint of military action on February 24, 2022, the actions have unmasked new approaches. Planned in the last couple of years and intensified in the last couple of months.<sup>1</sup> High level of world technological and economic connectivity have allowed for development of financial warfare in rudimentary capabilities. Similarly, for months, predictions have intensified that biological pathogens are a new domain of future warfare.<sup>2</sup> Advance response bio trainings are performed, where pathogen and detection date by coincidence are correspondent in the real life.<sup>3</sup> As a result, we have an established patterns and conditions where one or a group of nation-states can dictate a political path to one or a multitude of other nation-states. Not taking regard for other nation-states, concerns in the international arena and their interests.

Simultaneously, individual nation-states allow them self's having one directional diplomatic communication, with a

political-financial, proxy coercive approach to the degree of immeasurable long-term consequences. Diplomacy and international law are becoming more and more nonexistent. As it stands now, nation-state, for the reason of having a political position of its own, can be coerced. Or exposed to coordinated demonstration of political-financial warfare action, where national politics and economy of nation-state are positioned out of the equation.<sup>4</sup>

Equally, defense is becoming a field that, if nation-state invests into traditional methods, can be pointless endeavor. And if decides not to have a defense force, equally can be left without nothing. As a result, the contemporary direction of development of types of warfare and political steps has brought geopolitics to the highest level of omnipresence in nation-state internal politics and strategic planning.

If today nation-state still wants to keep its independence in the sense of independent political position, economy and interests. It should not attempt to compete and seek extravagant defense solutions. That will without doubt strain the economy and deliver questionable results when needed. It ought to seek direction to attain adaptive diplomatic, economic and defense posture in the progress of knowledge and proficiency of methods of force. By means that it possesses to match any diplomatic-political and military adversary.

## I. OBSERVATION

### 1.1 Observation outline

A note, before beginning, that the domain of the supra or convergent environment is a matter of perspective. Where asymmetrical and hybrid approaches of defense or attack are simultaneously used in a continuously prevailing environment. The supra or convergent environment is an area where strategic, operational, and tactical components, combined with an asymmetric approach amalgamate allowing defense advantage over adversary or adversaries in three elements. In simple terms, the convergent environment refers to the asymmetric-hybrid mix within warfare-level asymmetry: the greater the mix, the larger the environment, and the higher the probability of gaining an advantage.

Since the beginning of Russian military operations in Ukraine, commentators and officials are discussing new robust and expanding NATO, dollar weaponisation, political-financial warfare, and a combination of short-term effects and long-term outcomes. However, these comments, interpretations steer and contribute to an examination and reassessment. The main aim here is what has a combination of political and military actions, with every involved belligerent generated in a broader view.

The situation by itself, military, diplomatic, and political is still developing, and following could be called superficial. But when considering a broader overview, we find that diplomatic, political, and legal action, in concert with military action, has exposed multiple points that produce multiple consequences.

### 1.2 Observation – Methods and Thinking

Months ago, we could call trade and economic sanctions a political-economic action. Now, with the addition of banking blockade, asset seizure and weaponized currency, it has become an established asymmetric form or type of financial warfare with a range of means at disposal. Agreeing or disagreeing with the stated. The executed action combined with globalized connectivity is part that has made convergent environment certainty and asymmetric-hybrid defense against any adversary probable.

Timothy Thomas, July 2020, in the beginning of his “Russian Military Art and Advanced Weaponry” has written; “Russian General Staff Chief Valery Gerasimov has continually requested that the Academy of Military Science provide him with ideas about new forms and methods of warfare. One source defined methods as the use of weaponry and military art.”<sup>5</sup>

What is interesting in the above passage is that “form” is a type of warfare. And the “method” of warfare is how you fight this type of warfare and respond to it—military art and weaponry. If strategists of asymmetry in weaponized currency, and financial warfare thought they have produced a new way of warfare against any adversaries. The short answer is no. They just provided demonstration, answered the question asked by the Russian General Staff Chief, and solidify financial warfare as an asymmetric or regular type of warfare. From now on; it can now be classified as a direct attack by any nation-state. The world defense planning has just shifted into fifth gear—seeking how to respond to the specific or spectrum combination attack.<sup>6</sup>

If the previous part of supposition is entertaining, it is an effect that a broader overview of the defense concept is still an evading point. As well as, shock and awe excitement have not settled into the reality of the broader picture. For this we need to turn once more to Timothy Thomas, January 2020, “Russia’s New Military Theory: Updating Classical and Asymmetric Techniques” where he has written:

Russia’s two top military officials, Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu and General Staff Chief Valery Gerasimov, have stated that Russia’s military is constructing a new theory of warfare based on classical and asymmetric methods.

**Classical methods** appear to include the following... [But] there is no relation, in regard to terminology, between this list and US concepts... Russia’s thought pattern is different, but one that has been constant through the years. Some aspects were addressed by Western specialists, but several important ones were not. Gerasimov stated that the main thing for military

science today is to determine for Russia the possible nature of military conflicts, develop a system of forms and methods of operations of both a military and nonmilitary nature, and determine trends for the development of weapons and military equipment systems.

**Asymmetric thinking** in Russia, the other aspect of this new warfare theory, involves spotting vulnerabilities in an opponent’s thought process or his organization for war, the extended use of deception techniques, and so on. It also includes the use of “nonstandard” means and those that are prohibited, according to Russian sources.<sup>7</sup>

On said, without explanation, we could determine, by default, political-financial warfare has become an asymmetric nonstandard means of warfare. Just as it stands now, under the obscurity of necessary action is legal. However, there is a reality of disconnect—between legality, (political and military) thinking, methods, actions and direction. This disconnect can be corroborated between earlier written and created complex multi-domain relationship by currently implemented financial warfare actions against Russian Federation.

Still, financial warfare to be an effective, it needs tools or means to accomplish objective. Meaning to use financial warfare as an option in conflict against the adversary, it needs combined tools and means. Those could be bank transactions and trade blockades, with newer asset seizures and currency weaponisation implemented in a selective or combined manner.

However, here is where the complexity of created multi-domain relationship lies:

1. Tools or means of attack as weaponized currency to be successful needs attachment to other associate means in this case other currencies of nation-states.<sup>8</sup>
2. Action of use of weaponized currency is not as use of means as ships, airplanes, tanks, howitzers, armored personal carriers, missiles, etc. But once used in an action of non-contactless attack, it has limited maneuverability.
3. As a result, success and survival for main weaponized currency and any other currencies sustaining it needs rapid results because of connectivity with other currencies and economies—possibility of backfiring.<sup>9</sup>
4. Whereas, the aim of the use of financial warfare on the economy of adversarial nation-state is rapid economic collapse, and underlain economic detriment to every citizen of that nation state—but subsequently forgetting collective punishment is forbidden by the Geneva Convention.<sup>10</sup>

This complex assemble of multi-domain relationship, which touches finances and economies of multiple nation-states, combined with legality and international law, with connection to specter of military questions (in law, methods, thinking, planning, action and direction) does not end at this point.

It enhances by further implementing action—against (artist, athletes, journalist and others) known or unknown individuals in a way of economical and psychological action with obscured limitation. The rationale of limitation is, so it does not result in backlash with the population of its own nation-state. Still with an underlain objective of mass effect—to denounce government, nation-state, restrict travel and work, and public appearance. Affluent non-elected or office holding individuals with public recognition are targeted based on having political influence, and by paying taxes that support the nation-state military.

For this reason, they are pronounced legitimate target. However, with all accounted, there was one last underlain allowance of action to rival elected members of government to express in public and media; calls of assassination to other nation-state citizens in an alluded or direct form.<sup>11</sup>

In essence, the complex multi-domain relationship of actions employed through political-financial warfare is a spectrum of legal, military and diplomatic-political contradictions that are portrayed lawful in an internationally sanctioned sense. However, overlooking a broader view, that direction does not consider Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui deliberated and portrayed view in a book *Unrestricted Warfare*<sup>12</sup>, if everything is allowed, everything has just unlocked and is permitted.

It means, whatever has one adversarial side used against the other, what is preventing the other side of improving foundation “beyond limits”<sup>13</sup> on the action, and using it against the primary side. Otherwise; “asymmetric thinking [is] spotting vulnerabilities in an opponent’s thought process or his organization for war,”<sup>7</sup> improving the degree of action as conveniently and acting decisively to shock and awe.

On this point, we need to leap across the process to cross connect for reevaluation in the military domain.

### ***1.3 Observation – Evolving character of war***

All this cross connection in specifics that connects to overall mosaic can once again be found in Timothy Thomas’ article *Russia’s “New Military Theory: Updating Classical and Asymmetric Techniques.”*<sup>7</sup> He writes on Russian military thought, argumentation, and assesses that the new-warfare presents the impression of being in development. Despite this, he adds that new is more of an argumentative nature or is it:

Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu ... stated that modern conflict requires new approaches and that developing a new theory of warfare is the main task of the Armed Forces. Shoygu offered that “conflicts of a new generation involve a combination of classical and asymmetrical methods of conducting armed combat, where hostilities are fleeting, and there is simply no time for correcting mistakes.”<sup>1</sup>

What Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu stated has more to do with the emergent environment. Since, combination of methods is sought when we can notice emergent change or threat. The hybrid is combination,

amalgamation/mix, which is a part of the defense solutions approach. From stated, there is an awareness of new emergence, which has not clarified yet, but is becoming apparent.

Russian General Staff Chief Valery Gerasimov, in his ... presentation to the Academy of Military Science, stated that “Under these conditions our Armed Forces must be prepared to wage wars and armed conflicts of a new-type using classical and asymmetric methods of operations.”<sup>3</sup>

Timothy Thomas, in continuation, complements further with Russian military thinkers and their thought between new-generation and new type of warfare views and concerns:

Of interest is that Shoygu mentioned new-generation conflicts while Gerasimov noted conflicts of a new-type. Both of these concepts have been under discussion in Russian periodicals for a number of years. New generation was talked about extensively in Vladimir Slipchenko’s 2001 book *Noncontact War* as well as in a 2013 article in *Military Thought* by S. A. Bogdanov and S. G. Chekinov. Bogdanov had written on new-generation warfare even earlier in the same journal, in 2003. But after 2013, the new-generation concept all but disappeared from Russian writings.... In the meantime, the term “new type” conflict served as its substitute, to include in the writings of Chekinov and Bogdanov and many others. Maybe this was because General Staff Chief Valery Gerasimov mentioned the term in 2013 (and not new-generation) and again, as noted above, in 2019. Russian authors perhaps wanted to be in lock step with the Chief. Chekinov and Bogdanov, in 2017, stated that new type warfare is not only unique but is “**threatening to become the pivot of historical life in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.**”<sup>4</sup>

Furthermore, Timothy Thomas adds:

Not only have Russian theorists stressed the new-type concept over the past five years, but the Chinese military often utilizes the term as well. ...

This flip-flopping of concepts between new-generation and new type indicates that Russia’s military is still not settled on a formal “naming” concept to describe its approach to the conduct of future war.

Perhaps stating a case for classical and asymmetric warfare is the closest Russia can come to a stereotype or a compromise on new generation and new type. Neither the term classic nor the term asymmetric can be considered as “new.”

Either unknown to Timothy Thomas at the time of writing or identified as unrelated, the above cited paragraph section at present has significant importance. In conjunction with Ostapenko, Baushev and Morozov 2012, “Information-space support of Russian Federation armed forces groupings,” that offered a view of evolving character of war. Relationship between eluding “new-generation” and “new type” of war can be acknowledged with current international military state of affairs. (See table 1)

Table 1 – Evolving character of war

Generation of war	Armaments	Scale of armed (military) actions	Goal of war
First	Steel arms	Tactical	Destruction of adversary, possession of his valuables and territory
Second	Gunpowder, smoothbore weapons	Tactical, operational-tactical	Destruction of adversary, possession of his territory or establishment of control over it
Third	Rifled high-capacity weapon with increased rate of fire	Operational-tactical, operational	Destruction of adversary armed forces' groupings, establishment of control over territory and its resources
Fourth	Automatic and reactive weapons, tanks, aviation, navy, transport means, and connections	Operational-strategic	Destruction of armed forces of the adversary, destruction of his economic potential and political system
Fifth	Nuclear weapons and its limited or mass employment	Strategic, [operational-strategic]	Destruction of armed forces of the adversary, destruction of his economy and overthrow of his political system
Sixth	High-precision weapons based on land-air-sea, developed informational-space support	Strategic, operational-strategic, and operational	Conquering or establishing control over world resources of human livelihood, establishment of loyal power in states which have these resources on their territory, control of mass consciousness of peoples and large groups of people

Source: Kofman, Michael et al. (2021). Russian Military Strategy: Core Tenets and Operational Concepts. August 6, 2021. CNA Research Memorandum. Arlington, VA. p.10.<sup>14</sup>

The table 1 illustrates six stages of war evolution. If the designation “new-generation” was allowed to continue, it would conflict with foundation and the future theoretical development and military thought. By interpretation, this can be determined from a scale that the designation “new-generation” would fall between fifth and sixth generation of war, making the concepts ambiguous.

In contrast, General Staff Chief Valery Gerasimov and others deliberated about “new type” of conflict, which concurs with previously stated. Form is a type of warfare and the method of warfare is how you fight this type of warfare. For this we should observe table 1 again, where we can find that “armaments”, “scale of armed (military) actions” and “goal of war” corresponds to Russian assessment and prediction of “new type” of war, which is sixth generation war on the evolutionary ladder.

If we correlate all political, financial and military action of current conflict in Ukraine and above table will find scaling and all other action confusing or unclear. The Russian military assessed and interpreted the concept for future wars, which should be sixth generational warfare. If we observe current

conflict in Ukraine. It can be concluded it is a proxy war with the United States as lead principal and other allies with varied sponsorship. It can be also observed from table 1. That action implemented by RF on one side and USA/NATO and other allies with Ukraine as proxy client on the other side are waging warfare in two different generational levels.

Meaning actions implemented by USA/NATO and other allies (Ukraine as client included) is a fifth generation level response against the Russian Federation by a Russian assessment on table 1 concept. For a moment, we omit the Ukraine classic approach of defense. Than from known military approaches; USA/NATO and other allies combined implemented asymmetrical attempt. Given from generational level ladder and mix between other segments, political-financial warfare and goals of war and armament.

Therefore, if we proceed with this cross table view, not mixing situation on the ground. We are presented that one side is operating on a fifth level of operational warfare thinking and goals, whereas the other is operating on a sixth level of operational warfare thinking and defense. Conceptual prediction of Russian military thinking about future warfare implemented by pears will be in sixth level, but current response action is still in fifth level and even that things flow up, down, across and shortened in implemented action. Combination of amalgamated-mix has developed long-term convergent environment, which allows a new approach of defense and necessity of new economic planning.

So this will happen in three ways. Extrapolation based on known and hypothesized on unknown, to come with explanation and predict the methods of political-diplomatic and defense actions. Or political and military thinking will be in the form of closed loop—where a system is self-adjusted by varying conditions and feeding output information back as input and hoping for the best—in some kind of alliance. Last, by becoming proxy client nation-state and hope that defense choice is favorable enough to principle not to be forgotten in wider spectrum of political-diplomatic and defense questions.

#### 1.4 Observation – Proxy warfare

In proxy warfare, there is a possibility to make a “faux pas” because of placing emphasis on a particular specific. And that can especially transpire when we associate methods of attack and methods of defense in context of proxy warfare.

Still, there are a couple of things that different authors agree upon when it comes to proxy warfare. As first; through history is present and is not sufficiently analyzed. Second, when it comes to defining it, there are older and newer definitions. To support said, let’s reference and review the main ones.

Andrew Mumford in 2013 “Proxy Warfare and the Future of Conflict,” where he highlights two examples by Chris Loveman (2002) and Karl Deutsch (1964):<sup>15</sup>

Proxy wars are the product of a relationship between a benefactor, who is a state or non-state actor external to the dynamic of an existing conflict, and the chosen proxies who are the conduit for the benefactor’s weapons, training and funding. In short, proxy wars

are the logical replacement for states seeking to further their own strategic goals yet at the same time avoid engaging in direct, costly and bloody warfare.<sup>1</sup>

Proxy wars are international conflicts between two foreign powers, fought out on the soil of a third country; disguised as a conflict over an internal issue of that country; and using some of that country's manpower, resources and territory as a means for achieving preponderantly foreign goals and foreign strategies.<sup>2</sup>

Similarly, Frank Hoffman and Andrew Orner in 2021, "The Return of Great-Power proxy Wars" define proxy war and shortcomings of analyzes:

Proxy wars involve the sponsorship of actors by an external state to influence a violent conflict's outcome for the external state's own strategic purposes. This definition captures the desire of an external state (the "principal") to avoid direct action while supporting clients on the ground (state governments or local militia or contractors) as well as the prospect of violence in order to obtain desired political goals. Some scholars have recently proposed definitions that stress support to non-state actors, but that approach falls short of depicting the full range of state, transnational, or commercial entities that have historically been employed by great powers in the midst of strategic rivalry. Our conception does not assume similar interests between principals and clients, but does include the use of surrogates like private military companies, armed volunteers, or computer hacking groups.<sup>16</sup>

These three highlighted descriptions for proxy warfare may not come close to the problem of analysis of subject. But, they still reflect on challenges posed when commenting about the issue and linking it to developing specific. One of those specifics was mentioned by Zoran Ivanov 2020, "Changing the character of proxy warfare and its consequences for geopolitical relationships," where he writes:<sup>17</sup>

The complexity of the changes of the characteristics of proxy warfare are being examined from different angles by many authors. Andrew Mumford, in his article from 2013, "Proxy Warfare and the Future of Conflict", identified that transformation of traditional warfare and the rise of PMCs will lead to changes in the character of proxy warfare.

This is the part where questions arise. Can the character of Proxy warfare be changed? Or are just some characteristics of proxy warfare added, where may evolve in different directions. Ivanov provides from Cronin 2020 one interesting element; "Technological innovation has empowered malevolent individuals and organizations to act as proxy

forces with a reach that goes beyond the traditional battlefield."<sup>18</sup> This singular element opens an avenue of thinking. Added characteristics allow proxy warfare to evolve or transform to be used in a multitude of forms and dimensions to deliver the strategic goal of the principal. Still, war will stay war, and contingency of traditional is always an option. The goals of the client will always be a concern of the client if there are no other strategic plans from the principal.

Now, proxy warfare for decades had the characteristic of quasi hidden or disguised principals, fighting on a third party territory backing their own sides. The 2022 has seen something that has never been seen before. Ukrainian conflict was steered and prepared before any military action was implemented in Ukraine (restructuring of Ukraine's armed forces from 2014 until 2022). It can be observed that the government of Ukraine in public declaration has pronounced their territory and citizens' proxies in combating the Russian Federation to the allied coalition guided by the United States against the Russian Federation and their citizens.<sup>1</sup>

It could be said; one-sided and unfounded statement. But the rule of diplomacy and politics is not to stir and inflame wars, but to find a solution even at the commencement of the same. Not to mention the last eight years. Yet, when a government accepts proxy status and war conditions on their territory for external reasoning and political, financial, and military support. Then a declaration of waging a ten-year attrition war<sup>19</sup> on the beginning of military operations, with the recruitment of 20,000 foreigners by the Ukraine to fight the liberation war, raises questions again.<sup>20</sup>

The questions, which come to mind for this emphasized feature. Is Ukraine waging a ten-year liberation war, with foreigner volunteers on backs of all citizens of Ukraine? For whose account and direction of western regimes, politicians, and any other actors with special interest is the liberation war being fought? And is this a ten-year attrition war a promise of warfare only to accomplish casualties' numbers on both sides?<sup>21</sup>

This and many other questions that will arise will be answered in time to come. But what is opened is that we can now have nation-state enunciate proxy status by its actions, and be steered and backed by principal and principal allies. And still have an open confrontation between opposing sides—Russia-Ukraine. Yet, principal and his allies are actively involved but not attacked.

It looks like proxy warfare is developing to be a norm and form of warfare and political competition with near and peer declared rivals in 21<sup>st</sup> century. In addition, it seems on a global level as society we are running back into mid-19<sup>th</sup> all the way mid-13<sup>th</sup> century time of mercenaries and dark ages. Or we can just convey James Wither's conclusion, "renewal of great power competition to achieve influence, resources and security, without employing their military forces in a manner that could cause a major war."<sup>22</sup>

### **1.5 Observation – Legal segment**

Legal segment, the part that needs revisit, not to reiterate already stated. But just to draw on main points and

extrapolate. Before February 24, 2022, individuals could travel and do business anywhere in the world—where this was legally allowed. Now political-financial warfare and his hybrid combinations allows elected or non-elected, together with known or unknown (artist, athletes, journalist and other) individuals to be pronounced legitimated military targets.<sup>23</sup> Basic premise for the use of political-financial warfare and its hybrid combinations against individuals is that they need to renounce their nation-state and government. But the most interesting legal association about affluent is, they pay taxes in their respective nation-state and with that support economy and military, which gives them a power of influence. Equally, political-financial warfare action is used against the economy of the nation-state and its citizens. And all is deemed legal, at least from the side, using it and those supporting it. Not giving second thoughts about Geneva Convention and War Crime of Collective Punishment.<sup>10</sup>

But then again, it was forgotten from “fog of war” that this implemented action is not just sanctioning action anymore, but warfare. And that similar individuals do not exist only in nation-state on the receiving end. We come again to questioning. What is forbidding any other side in the future of enhancing political-financial warfare's foundation beyond limits on the action already implemented? Or better, ad-hoc rules, laws, policies can be evoked at any-time against anyone in the world now, whom politicians and nation-state regime actors deem necessary—in form of preemptive action.

To capture and illustrate how this can escalate in the context of future unlimited warfare, let's observe a couple of examples:

1. French government action against French and other nationals by mining of vessel *Rainbow Warrior* in 1985—civilian activists.<sup>24</sup>

2. Newer—Canadian government action against their own citizens—“Freedom convoy” blockade of traffic, but peaceful protests. Reaction, pronouncement of citizens, a terrorist and use of antiterrorist laws with a hybrid approach to other non-protesting citizens—blocking of personal finances and pronouncing publicly nation-state citizens as protest collaborators. Similar action of humiliation of protesters was used in France by public call to be stripped of their citizenship.<sup>25</sup>

3. If the above examples did not define how all can be combined and can escalate beyond limits, in the present context combination of political-financial warfare action. Then, only what can be said is—disposition matrix. Its United States legal and force implemented action known as disposition matrix or unofficially known as kill list. It was implemented under Obama's administration in 2010. Which has become a permanent characteristic of U.S. policy against other nation-state's citizens or citizens of the United States if deemed necessary—anywhere in the world.<sup>26</sup>

It can always be argued that examples are not representative and disposition matrix example is policy meant for terrorism. But in the world of evolving warfare, state-political-elite personal interests, anyone can be pronounced terrorist or just to be put on someone's list as deemed necessary. As an example, DHS and SATA No Fly List of the United States and Canada can be used for assessment. It is a list of dangerous persons from aspect of air traffic security or nation-state entry. However, if a detailed assessment is taken of individuals included on a list. You will find a list filed with regular citizens, diplomats/politicians combined with the world most wanted. Swift conclusion allows us to consider that in a not distant future, a new catalog by multiple nation-states will be just an amalgamated assortment of unlocked disposition matrix lists. And this will form a basis for escalation without limits.<sup>27</sup>

If we want to corroborate if these escalation actions already exist in or through political-financial warfare, we do not need to look far. Letter of Marque and Reprisal by implementation it induces a spectrum of legal consequences. United States is the only nation-state that has never annulled archaic law governing Letter of Marque and Reprisal, which was only issued in time of war to privateers from 13<sup>th</sup> to 19<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>28</sup>

However, looking from 2001 out of three attempts to enact the law, two were unsuccessful. The third attempt, “H.R.6869 - To authorize the President of the United States to issue letters of marque and reprisal for the purpose of seizing the assets of certain Russian citizens, and for other purposes” law was enacted.<sup>29</sup> Nation-states cooperate not even completely comprehending under what law they are cooperating with that action, they are directly involving their nation-state in warfare. Because by the legal definition governing the Letter of Marque and Reprisal, they are becoming direct or indirect belligerents in warfare.<sup>30</sup>

4. From legal standpoint—it's irrelevant, was Letter of Marque and Reprisal issued to private individual, company or governmental agency. In this case, it was issued to FBI - Federal bureau of investigation, which makes this even more complicated. Official federal agency and, if not known, FBI at the same time is counterintelligence agency of the United States.<sup>31</sup> It has been issued a military grade document to be applied in time of peace (no state of war exists between two countries) against Russian nationals to have their assets seized. On account that listed individuals pay taxes to Russian federation and they have influence. Therefore, an explanation for the action is their criminally gained assets will be seized, on account of paying taxes, having connections and influence. Interesting formulation from a legal standpoint. We are at peace, not war. The United States federal agency is issued a military grade document to seize criminally gained assets, because high net Russian individuals pay taxes with, which Russian federation supports military budget. The final conclusion on above written is that there is no possibility in the future of any escalation beyond limits by any nation-state in the world.

However observed or assessed, legal activity has compounding action and implications. Law is based and combined on written parts and enhanced with any legal action implemented, which means that is constantly evolving and progressed—for better or worst. Any actions based on the implemented law and especially warfare associated. It has meaning and the foundation for defining prior actions before and at the onset of war. Together, they expose all the belligerent sides that are involved in warfare—not just those that can be seen. Equally, if we allow distortion of reality and laws governing warfare to unilateral interpretation, convergent environment is setting future in default of no limits.

### 1.6 Observation end remarks

The biggest paradox lies in the foundation of implemented actions. All allied nation-states with the Ukraine that have accepted United States actions and legal approach to solving the problem of the past eight years in Ukraine.<sup>1</sup> Combined with actions at the onset of Russian military action have consigned the world to the future of unrestricted military thinking and planning. These combined actions allow for the birth of new proxy, unrestricted warfare, and convergent environment or “modified combined war that goes beyond limits”<sup>13</sup> to become reality—in global context.

Without being an irrevocable conclusion. Politicians of some nation-states have used asymmetry to asymmetrically written them self’s, affluent, and influential individuals to legally binding law. And with that, become part of nation-state legitimate war target—as a type of Sword of Damocles equation over their lives. In simple terms, unrestricted warfare and convergent environment compounded action allow for a possibility of future preemptive action. Never has in history of rules of engagement or warfare. An action been written and employed in a manner that action employed has enhanced value to any adversarial side, then thought by a side using it.

## 2 ORIENTATIONS

### 2.1 Orientational outline

In warfare to decide and act, we need to orientate to assess what was observed. But to orientate ourselves, there is a certain element to examine and evaluate—space. Space or environment, in which new types of warfare and future operations are going to be conducted, in one form or the other, it is going to be contested in the convergent method.

Supra-environment, or as here termed convergent environment; is environment that allows and combines asymmetric and hybrid warfare. Asymmetric signifying unequal and irregular, and hybrid is a combination of different things—amalgamation or mixture of different aspects or components, both elements together producing convergent environment.

This convergent environment is nothing else then operational environment, where everything converges and amalgamates for achievement of strategic objective—be it in defense or attack. The prospect of success of the objective lies in knowledge and his converged application. The table 2 illustrates this convergent and operational environment, and

the importance and potential of knowledge in future warfare.

Table 2 – Convergent environment

Convergent environment				
OODA LOOP <sup>32</sup>		OPERATIONAL ART <sup>33</sup>		REFLEXIVE CONTROL <sup>34</sup>
Observe	[through]	Time	[to reach]	Complete picture
Orientate	[in]	Space	[to assess]	Actualization of plans (intellectual potential and space)
Decide	[on]	Means	[to settle on]	Conformity of goals (mission, place, time & method)
Act	[with]	Purpose	[so that]	The modeling or forecasting of the condition (at the time of action are being implemented)
[-]	[-]	[-]	[does not require uncertainty in]	Anticipation of events

Modeled on consolidation of two different decision-making processes and equilibrium points of operational art to demonstrate a convergent environment

### 2.2 Operational art in convergent environment

In the best interests of further deliberation and design. Why would we say that this new environment now exists or will exist? By equally rudimentary assessment of semi-hidden political sentiment on a global geopolitical level by peer or near peer competitors—there is a desire for unadulterated war. Even present nuclear attitude sounds like, if there were no nuclear weapons, or let’s agree not to use it—let’s start a conventional war and winner takes all. Again, statement could be assessed as unsubstantiated. But there is a mix of individuals and groups of actors, especially in the west that openly support military actions for only their known reasons. But no one is hiding that one of economic calculation is or could be a beneficial part.<sup>35</sup>

Rudimentary or not, from all observed, said, illustrated, and assessed. The combined action of different elements as; diplomatic, political, economic, military, with the actions implemented in an environment that was. Has or is producing new supra environment that, as said it provides the impression of convergence.

It is allowed to be said that it does not exist, or it can be called differently. But the convergent environment now exists from a multitude of unsubstantiated, unchecked actions that are implemented in a digitalized environment. Based on the assumption of getting an outcome like we are in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, but with a speed of a 21<sup>st</sup> century that we live in. Not to mention that some actions that are being implemented were based on laws of mid-13<sup>th</sup> to mid-19<sup>th</sup> century—Letter of Marque and Reprisal.<sup>36</sup>

If on the above said is given an assessment. What does the convergent environment that exists mean for defense of the nation-state? If viewed from a position of developing of multipolar world and said present nuclear attitude. It could be illustrated as—in short of purposely antagonizing a nuclear armed nation-state to humiliate in open conventional warfare. Defense is possible against any adversary regardless of the size and armament. Meaning, the Ukraine conflict has allowed a convergent environment to occur. And has opened the types and methods of warfare in a variety of amalgamation, where defense and attack can be implemented by any nation-state with relatively minimal means for maximum effect.

Could a convergent environment be called a convergent warfare environment? It could be interchangeable designation—in time of peace is just a convergent environment in which everything functions. In time of warfare becomes specific and concentrated. Defense preparation and operations have no influence on the convergent environment—except if changing the convergent environment itself.

Convergent environment, considered through equilibrium of operational art and flexibility of response:

- **Time**—when time is not of essence, respond by intuition
- **Space**—defense of nation-state is not based on adversary direction of attack
- **Means**—is knowledge, intelligence, and method combined with a variety of equipment
- **Purpose**—if defense is the primary rationale of warfare, the victory is assured or highly probable

Let's elaborate in the abstract on about above written. Time can be rendered irrelevant in a convergent environment based on the type of warfare used and methods employed. Space or environment is relevant for defense and attack, dependent on the adversary and the final objective. The knowledge is the primary means of defense and attack, together with the holder of knowledge—the equipment is secondary—whatever the variety of equipment is. As long as the purpose of military operations lies in defense, the success of achieving nation-state objectives is assured or highly probable against any adversary.

### **2.3 Principles of war in convergent environment**

Before bringing the orientation segment to an end, the principles of war should be added and mentioned. However, defined by different nation-state armed forces, the principles of war are part of doctrine and military art that guides preparation for and conduct of military operations. Therefore, principles in convergent environment should be succinct to allow for unrestricted thought in preparation and conduct of operations. To operate in a convergent environment, the principles should be flattened on select points that do not allow for divergence from military or operational thinking. Five assorted points are presented that are self-explanatory and succinct takes on military principles. Otherwise, additional explanations of principles can be found in armed forces' doctrines around the world. What is essential at this

point is that the set group allows for direction in clear and unobstructed thought.

- **Legitimacy** – maintain legal and moral authority in the conduct of operations.
- **Objective** – maintain military operation to attainable objective.
- **Simplicity** – prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and concise orders.
- **Surprise** – offensive action has a result of surprise, induced by the deliberate or incidental introduction of the unexpected.
- **Initiative** – allow for constant adaptability to actively secure initiative.

In the end, one thing that should never be overlooked in thought, preparation, planning and conduct of operations. The knowledge and experience can be sought anywhere, but must always be transferable to contemporary circumstances.<sup>37</sup>

## 3 DECISIONS

### **3.1 Decision outline**

All current political and military actions surrounding the Ukraine conflict have produced additional operational necessity for all nation-states. But especially those that are not involved in conflict to develop their own defense response capabilities. Every action that can be observed and assessed will be modeled in vertical level of the operational part. In the end, the combination of taken actions has produced a necessity for a comprehensive upsurge in operational expertise.

Meaning, current condition has put emphasis on knowledge of operational expertise to adapt and outline defense concept in convergent environment. Objective of any nation-state and defense forces will be to develop an operational plan that connects nation-state strategic, operational and tactical part. In such a manner, that is possible to respond in a way that utilizes all available means for the foreseeable future. Implying toward the knowledge capabilities to have proficiency to respond with available means at hand. And deployment of defense capability in a manner to support and sustain nation-state in direct, but especially indirect, attack in convergent environment.

Condensed manner from all above, written. There is a direct necessity of literal attainment of ability to apply knowledge in a way that allows command of current and desired in a convergent environment. As well as the ability to operate in such an environment, and respond and develop new means and methods that support mission in space and time.

### **3.2 Decision segment case design**

As earlier stated in table 2, decide on means to settle on mission place, time and method. In one form or the other, all world nation-state and armies will attempt to respond to observed and try to progress operational segment that utilizes all of the available means of nation-state. This necessity of means includes operational knowledge, respectively. So that in transpired convergent environment, category III nation-state can respond in form of defense and attack by means available.

As Andrew Krepinevich in 1992/2002, “The Military-Technical Revolution: A Preliminary Assessment” says; “The [nation-state] would not seek information dominance, but readily accept an ‘information neutral’ environment. Its missions would involve denying ... military forces control of space, the air, and the sea, rather than attempting to control those media itself.”<sup>38</sup> How this exploratory interpretation looks in a digital environment of 21<sup>st</sup> Century can be seen in table 3.

Table 3 - Asymmetric and hybrid defense mode scale

<b>Asymmetric and hybrid defense mode scale</b>
<p><b>Level 4 Engagement: Sea, Air and Land</b>                  If three levels of engagement did not deliver agreeable resolve—opponent can be engaged in amalgamated combination on Sea, Air and Land until final outcome is reached</p>
<p><b>Level 3 Engagement: Outer Space</b>                  Shrapnel-Kessler Mining Warhead                  SKMW</p>
<p><b>Level 2 Engagement: Sea</b>                  Underwater Cable Destruction                  UCD</p>
<p><b>Level 1 Engagement: Sea</b>                  Sea Mines and Costal Sea Mining                  SM-CSM</p>

Modeled on: Andrew Krepinovich - The Military-Technical Revolution: A Preliminary Assessment.<sup>38</sup>

The interpreted model presents a combined asymmetric and hybrid approach or one method to the problem. The modeling scale of level 1, 2 and 3 are specifics that are assigned to asymmetry and combined with Level 4 as hybrid action, which only point to, but without, explicit illustration. What is missing overall is operational design or plan procedure for execution of all four levels. However, old “Soviet [and still contemporary Russian has] focus of deep operations within the concept of operational art requires mobilizing and coordinating often very dissimilar elements of combat power to achieve the desired results. The object of the Soviets was to attack an enemy nearly simultaneously throughout his depth to effect the complete disintegration of the ability and will to fight.”<sup>39</sup>

Meaning, that even if the presented model does not illustrate selected hybrid action and leaves operational design out. It allows from theory to be determined, that model and consecutive orders of actions do not need be the same. But the model connected to theory allows for a connected understanding of operational art, deep operations or deep attack to develop an abstract representation of the direction of operational design. Where, operational design expressed as questions says: what is the current environment, desired environment, the problem and the solution? What was exploratory interpretation for Andrew Krepinovich has in digitalized 21<sup>st</sup> Century become reality through combined actions implemented by different belligerent actors to produce capability in operational level that permits category III nation-

state defense and attack against category II and I—perfect convergent environment.

“The most ideal method of operation for dealing with an enemy who pays no regard to the rules is certainly just being able to break through the rules.”<sup>40</sup> But an even more ideal method of operation is when an enemy applies rules that permit disrupting his entire defense or attack. And opens himself to complete disintegration of ability and will to fight.

4 ACTION

4.1 Action contour

Whatever was above written and viewpoint expressed and the viewpoint derived—one is certain—Pandora’s Box of wider warfare environment has been opened. Everyone has seen a wide spectrum of warfare models being implemented and contra-act moves are now being sought.

The moment that coordinated political-financial and proxy warfare was executed, it has backfired and failed. Not because that it cannot be used again, but it has created a convergent environment of warfare. And it has showed that no nuclear nation-state wants to use nuclear weapons, but they want to fight the adversary for one or the other political or financial reason. This is the breaking point in geopolitics that will allow new standard to fight any opposing adversary no matter the size of nation-state, his economy, or military power. What this democratic geopolitical gamble has indicated is that warfare or other military operation can be fought by direct and indirect means—no proxy necessary. Future sanctions will be countered by sanctions. Or, as it now stands, financial warfare will be countered by financial warfare. What is going to be different is the implemented model.

The large and strong economies will use financial-economic coercion and warfare, military coercion and force. But independent, robust, small and weaker nation-states will now organize to implement financial or other models of warfare or asymmetric-hybrid actions at the moment’s notice. Through the methods of locking adversary and any allies to flatten the economic and military strength. Using means that can equally shock, and devastate strong and large nation-state, and any allies involved. These future financial and other models of warfare will come in the lowest of arrangements by any nation-state with military capability and military industry. The action will be acted by an immediate counteraction to disconnect opponent and allies. Including, their ability of intelligence network infrastructure, communication and any other prearranged power coercive coordination response.

Therefore, as said before, the nation-states that will want to keep its independent political position, economy and interests. Will need to seek direction to attain adaptive diplomatic, economic and defense posture through progress of knowledge and proficiency of methods of economy, diplomacy and force with means that they have, to match any economic, diplomatic, political and military question that will arise in the future.

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## 2. Orientations

### 2.1 Orientational outline

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**3.** Robinson, James (1997). The Rommel Myth. September-October, 1997. Military Review, The Professional Journal of the US Army. Volume LXXVII. No 5. p.81. Accessed at: <https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p124201coll1/id/429/> (20/06/22) **Note:** Operational art comprises four essential elements: time, space, means and purpose. Each element is found in greater complexity at the operational level than at the tactical or strategic level. This is true, in part, because operational art must consider and incorporate more of the strategic and tactical levels than those levels must absorb from the operational level.

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## 3. Decisions

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